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peal all laws in "conflict therewith shall be of no further 
force or effect." 
[7] Costs-On Appeal-Items Allowable.-The Legislature has 
the power to enact, subsequent to the effective date of the 
Rules on Appeal, a statute which would have the effect of 
amending Rules on Appeal, rule 26 (c), listing additional items 
of costs to be recovered on appeal. 
[8] Courts-Judicial CounciL-The rule-making power of the 
Judicial Council is limited by existing law, the Constitution 
reserving to the Legislature and the people the primary and 
higher right to provide rules of procedure for courts with 
the secondary right in the Judicial Council to adopt rules only 
when and where the higher authority of the Legislature and 
the people has not been exercised. 
[9] Costs-What Law Governs.-Costs are given only by statutory 
direction and their allowance depends on the terms of the 
statute in force at the time of accrual of the right to have them 
taxed, and a rule pertaining to allowance of costs may be 
changed or modified by statute during pendency of the pro-
ceeding. 
[10] Id.- Items Allowable- Bond Premiums.-Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 1035, which permits the premium on any surety bond to 
be included as an item of costs to the party to whom costs are 
allowed, includes the qualification "unless the court determines 
that the bond was unnecessary," and the court's order dis-
allowing the cost of a bond premium on the ground that such 
a cost was not specified in Rules on Appeal, rule 26(c), and 
that Code Civ. Proc., § 1035, did not apply at the appeal level, 
was not a finding that the bond was unnecessary, and in the 
absence of such a finding the cause on appeal should be re-
versed with directions that the trial court determine whether 
or not a bond was necessary. 
[11] Appeal-Right of Review- Loss of Right- Acceptance of 
Benefits.-A judgment creditor may accept a tender of that 
portion of the judgment favorable to him and to which he is 
admittedly entitled without losing his right to appeal from 
a severable portion of the judgment unfavorable to him. 
[12] Judgments- Satisfaction.-An order granting defendant's 
motion to enter satisfaction of judgment and to release all 
attachments was error where the court did not take into con-
sideration as a cost item recoverable by the judgment creditor 
the amount of a bond premium which was the subject of a 
pending appeal, and where defendant did not give an under-
taking under Code Civ. Proc., §§ 554, 555, for the release of 
the attachments in the amount of costs demanded by plaintiff. 
[12] See Cal.Jur.2d, Judgments, § 319 et seq.; Am.Jur., Judg-
ments, § 862 et seq. 
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APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of San 
Joaquin County granting motions to retax costs on appeal 
and to enter satisfaction of judgment, discharge liens created 
by the recording of abstracts of judgment and to release all 
levies of attachment or execution. George F. Buck and 
Thomas B. Quinn, Judges. Reversed with directions. 
Freed & Freed, Eli Freed and Eugene A. Mash for Ap-
pellant. 
Smith & Zeller for Respondent Palermo. 
CARTER, J.-Stockton Theatres, Inc., appeals from two 
orders (1) that portion of an order retaxing costs filed on 
December 17, 1954, which granted the motion of defendant 
Palermo to retax costs as to the premiums on a surety bond 
to preserve an attachment on appeal; (2) from a minute 
order of January 27, 1955, granting the motion of defendant 
Palermo to enter satisfaction of judgment and to discharge 
the liens created by the recording of abstracts of judgment 
and to release all levies of attachment or execution. 
On June 5, 1944, Emil Palermo, the owner and lessor of 
the Star Theatre in Stockton, brought an action for declara-
tory relief against the lessee, Stockton Theatres, Inc., in 
an endeavor to have the lease declared void because the stock-
holders of the lessee were Japanese nationals. On June 11, 
1945, the lease was declared void. Immediately thereafter 
Palermo brought an action for forcible detainer and a judg-
ment was rendered in his favor whereby he obtained pos-
session of the theater. Stockton Theatres appealed from both 
judgments. The judgment in the declaratory relief action 
was reversed by this court in Palermo v. Stockton Theatres, 
Inc., 32 Cal.2d 53 [195 P.2d 1]. This had the effect of 
adjudicating that the lease was valid and that under it Stock-
ton Theatres was entitled to possession of the theater as a 
tenant thereof. 
Stockton Theatres then brought an action for restitution. 
During the pendency of the first appeals Palermo had oper-
ated the theater profitably and Stockton Theatres asked that 
he be compelled to account to it for the income he had de-
rived therefrom. The trial court took an account and ad-
judged that Stockton Theatres recover from Palermo the 
sum of $13,658.75. Both parties appealed. The appeal was 
decided in favor of Stockton Theatres and the judgment 
detailed statement of the 
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which he contends has become the law of the case, Stockton 
Theatres has no legal authority to seek the cost of the 
premium on the bond as an item of costs on appeal. It 
seems that for the purposes of the law of the case, the state-
ment heretofore referred to which held that section 946 
was only applicable where the defendant had prevailed in 
the trial court may be considered dictum. The court con-
cluded as follows: ''The motion to vacate the attachments 
is denied, and as previously noted, the motion to dismiss 
plaintiff's appeal is deferred, to be considered and deter-
mined together with the appeal on its merits." If, as pre-
viously set forth, the District Court believed that the lien 
of attachment had "merged with the judgment [and] said 
section [946] has no applicability," it would appear that 
defendants' motion to discharge the attachment should have 
been granted rather than denied. This could, however, apply 
only insofar as the judgment went-to the sum of $13,658.75 
awarded to plaintiff. [2] The discussion or determination of 
a point not necessary to the disposition of a question that 
is decisive of the appeal is generally regarded as obiter 
dictum and not as the law of the case. We held in Allen 
v. California Mut. Bldg. & Loan Assn .. , 22 Cal.2d 474, 489 
[139 P.2d 321], that "This discussion is obviously based 
upon the erroneous assumption that the presentation of a 
claim by the investor was still required under the 1935 amend-
ment, and this in spite of the inclusion of the words 'without 
presenting a claim' in the statute. .And the doctrine of the 
law of the case does not require this court to follow an 
interpretation which is clearly obiter dictum. The statement 
of facts in the discussion, assumed for the purpose of illus-
trating the necessity of the court's construction of the statute, 
presupposed a situation. . . . '' [3] In the instant case the 
court presupposed a situation for the purpose of illustrating 
its theory of how the statute should be construed. The il-
lustration was clearly erroneous and it is obvious that the 
decision was not predicated upon the court's construction 
of the statute. Hence, we are not bound to follow the District 
Court's erroneous interpretation of the scope of section 946 
of the Code of Civil Procedure under the doctrine of the law 
of the case. (See also Hammond v. McDonald, 49 Cal..App.2d 
671 [122 P.2d 332] ; 4 Cal.Jur.2d, § 698, p. 604; Millsap v. 
Balfour, 158 Cal. 711 [112 P. 450] ; Mttlford v. Estudillo, 
32 Cal. 131.) In order to avoid confusion the holding of 
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the District Court of .Appeal in this respect is specifically 
disapproved. 
Section 961 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which became 
effective in 1943, provides that "The Judicial Council shall 
have the power to prescribe by rules for the practice and 
procedure on appeal, and for the time and manner in which 
the records on such appeals shall be made up and filed, in 
all civil actions and proceedings in all courts of this State .... 
"The rules reported as aforesaid shall take effect on July 
1, 1943, and thereafter all laws in conflict therewith shall 
be of no further force or effect.'' 
Section 1034 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that 
"In appeals from the superior and municipal courts, costs 
shall be awarded as provided in rules adopted by the Judicial 
Council. ... The party entitled to costs, or to whom costs 
are awarded, may recover all amounts actually paid out by 
him in connection with said appeal, and the preparation of 
the record for the appeal. . . . " ( Stats. 1945, ch. 40, § 5.) 
Rule 26(c) of the Rules on Appeal (36 Cal.2d 22, 23) 
lists certain costs which may be recovered. The premium 
paid on a bond to preserve an attachment on appeal is not 
one of the items of costs listed. 
Section 1035 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which was 
added to the Code in 1951 (Stats. 1951, ch. 1327, § 1) pro-
vides: "Whenever in this code or by other provision of law 
costs are allowed to a party to an action or other proceeding, 
such costs shall include the premium on any surety bond 
which was procured by the party entitled to recover costs 
in connection with the action or proceeding unless the court 
determines that the bond was unnecessary.'' 
Section 1035 has, apparently, never before been construed 
by an appellate court. Stockton Theatres argues that it 
is a general provision and applies to the appellate stage 
of a proceeding as well as to the trial stage; Palermo con-
tends that it applies only to the trial stage and that rule 
26 (c) of the Rules on Appeal is the exclusive measure of 
the costs which may be recovered on appeal. Stockton Theatres 
argues that the Legislature had the power to adopt section 
1035 and that it superseded any rule in conflict with it. 
Palermo concedes that the Legislature had the power to 
provide in section 1035 that the premium on a surety bond 
was a proper item of costs on appeal, but argues that it 
did not do so because the appeal stage was not specifically 
set forth in the section. The statute is general-it specifies 
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Procedure in the amount of the costs demanded by Stockton 
Theatres. It is contended that a satisfaction of the judgment 
is the last act and the end of the proceedings (Brochier v. 
Brochier, 17 Cal.2d 822, 825 [112 P.2d 602] ; Cason v. Glass 
Bottle Blowers Assn., 113 Cal.App.2d 263 [247 P.2d 931]) 
and that except where a valid release is given, or there is a 
lawful agreement otherwise providing, a judgment may be 
satisfied or discharged only by payment in full with accrued 
interest and costs (2 Freeman on Judgments, 5th ed., p. 2329). 
It would appear that since the judgment creditor (Stockton 
Theatres, Inc.) cannot prevent the judgment debtor (Palermo) 
from avoiding possible liability for accruing interest, pend-
ing an appeal, by refusing tender of the amount due (People 
v. Roath, 62 Cal.App.2d 241 [144 P.2d 648] ), that the trial 
court properly entered a satisfaction of judgment as to the 
amount of the judgment, interest, and the undisputed costs. 
However, Stockton Theatres appealed from the order retaxing 
costs as to the amount of $6,980.49 which was stricken by the 
trial court. [11] The judgment creditor may accept a tender 
of that portion of the judgment favorable to him and to which 
he is admittedly entitled without losing his right to appeal from 
a severable portion of the judgment unfavorable to him 
(Stein v. Simpson, 37 Cal.2d 79 [230 P.2d 816]). Section 554 
of the Code of Civil Procedure provides, in part, that when-
ever any defendant has appeared in the action "such de-
fendant may upon reasonable notice to the plaintiff, apply to 
the court in which the action is pending, or to the judge 
thereof, for an order to discharge the attachment wholly, 
or in part; and upon the execution of the undertaking men-
tioned in the next section, an order may be made releasing 
from the operation of the attachment, any or all of the prop-
erty of such defendant attached .... " Section 555 provides 
for the undertaking which the court or judge ''must require'' 
before making such an order. 
[12] It appears that the trial court erred in releasing 
Stockton Theatres' attachment without taking into considera-
tion the amount of the cost of the bond premium which was 
the subject of a pending appeal, and in ordering a full satis-
faction of judgment. The order of the trial court would have 
been correct had defendant complied with sections 554 and 
555 of the Code of Civil Procedure as heretofore set forth. 
For the reasons heretofore set forth the orders appealed 
from are reversed and the trial court directed to determine 
the necessity for the bond required to preserve the attachment 
Dec.1956] PEOPLE v. FARMER 
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pending appeal, and, if it is determined that such bond was 
necessary, allow the amount of the premium paid therefor 
as an item of the costs on appeal to which plaintiff is entitled. 
The amount so allowed to be a lien upon any property of 
Palermo covered by the attachment heretofore levied. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., Spence, 
J., and McComb, J., concurred. 
[Crim. No. 5879. In Bank. Dec. 11, 1956.] 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. ED FARMER, Appellant. 
[1] Chattel Mortgages-Offenses-Sale of Mortgaged Property.-
Intent to defraud is an essential element of the offense of 
selling mortgaged chattels without giving the mortgagee prior 
notice in writing. (Disapproving People v. Phillips, 27 Cal. 
App. 409, 150 P. 75; People v. Phillips, 30 Cal.App. 31, 157 P. 
1003, 1005.) 
[2] !d.-Offenses-Sale of Mortgaged Property.-Pen. Code, § 538, 
designates the offense of selling mortgaged chattels without 
giving written notice to the mortgagee as "larceny," and to 
establish the crime of larceny a felonious intent to steal must 
be proved. 
[3] !d.-Offenses-Sale of Mortgaged Property.-Where a mort-
gagee of chattels consents to their sale, Pen. Code, § 538, may 
not be construed as making it a crime for the mortgagor to 
fail to give prior written notice of intent to sell. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Merced 
County and from an order denying a new trial. R. R. Sischo, 
Judge. Reversed. 
Prosecution for sale of mortgaged chattels without giving 
mortgagee a prior notice in writing. Judgment of conviction 
reversed. 
Robert R. Elledge and Muir Wooley for Appellant. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and G. A. Strader, 
Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent. 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Chattel Mortgages, § 100; Am.Jur., Chattel 
Mortgages, § 272. 
McK. Dig. Reference: [1-3] Chattel Mortgages, § 112. 
